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Anna Glenszczyk Negational Fragment of
Intuitionistic Control Logic
Abstract. We investigate properties of monadic purely negational fragment of Intuition-
istic Control Logic (ICL). This logic arises from Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IPL)
by extending language of IPL by additional new constant for falsum. Having two diﬀerent
falsum constants enables to deﬁne two forms of negation. We analyse implicational rela-
tions between negational monadic formulae and present a poset of non equivalent formulae
of this fragment of ICL.
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1. Introduction
Intuitionistic Control Logic (ICL) was deﬁned semantically and proof the-
oretically by Chuck Liang and Dale Miller in their joint work [1,2]. This
logic can be seen as a combination of classical and intuitionistic logics. The
original impetus for ICL came from the search for a logic that would pre-
serve the crucial connective of intuitionistic implication and at the same
time would be able to type programming language control operators such as
call/cc. ICL adds to the language of IPL a new constant ⊥ which is distinct
from intuitionistic falsum 0. Having these two falsum constants 0 and ⊥
enables to deﬁne two forms of negation: ∼A = A → 0 and ¬A = A →⊥
respectively.
Let us compare negations in classical and intuitionistic logics. We denote
intuitionistic negation by ∼A and classical by ¬A. It corresponds with no-
tation in ICL and intuitive meaning of ¬A as “classical” negation in this
logic. In Classical Propositional Logic (CPL) there exist only two non equiv-
alent negational formulae: A,¬A. The classical negation is involutive i.e.
¬¬A ↔ A is a CPL tautology, so it is not possible to deﬁne a new operator
by iterating classical negation. In IPL there are three non equivalent nega-
tional formulae: A,∼A,∼∼A. It is known that ∼∼A does not imply A in
intuitionistic logic, but ∼∼∼A ↔ ∼A is an intuitionistic tautology. Thus us-
ing intuitionistic implication we can obtain a new operation which is a double
negation ∼∼. Further multiplying of intuitionistic negations will only give
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us (up to equivalence) a formula ∼A in the case of odd number of negations
or a formula ∼∼A if there is even number of negations to start with.
In Intuitionistic Control Logic there are two distinct negations: an ordi-
nary intuitionistic negation denoted ∼A and ¬A which bears some charac-
teristics of classical negation. Combination of these two kinds of negation
results in possibility of forming new operators. We extract them and present
their relations with respect to intuitionistic implication.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we recall some facts about ICL from [1]. We consider only
propositional logic. Language of ICL consists of countably many variables
denoted p1, p2, p3, . . ., intuitionistic connectives ∨,∧,→ called respectively
disjunction, conjunction and implication and of three constants 0, 1,⊥. As
a shorthand for (A → B)∧(B → A) we use the expression A ↔ B. A Kripke
model for ICL will be called an r-model and is deﬁned as follows.
Definition 2.1. A Kripke r-model is a quadruple of the form 〈W, r ,≤,〉
where W is a ﬁnite, non-empty set, ≤ is a reﬂexive and transitive relation
on the set W and  is a binary relation between elements of W and atomic
formulae called forcing. Elements of the set W are called worlds or nodes.
The element r ∈ W is the root of the model. It is the least element of the
set W ( r ≤ u for every world u ∈ W ).
The forcing relation  is monotone, that is if u ≤ v then u  p implies
v  p. The  relation is extended to all formulae in the following way. Let
u, v, i ∈ W .
• u  1 and u  0
• r ⊥
• i ⊥ for all i > r
• u  A ∨ B iﬀ u  A or u  B
• u  A ∧ B iﬀ u  A and u  B
• u  A → B iﬀ for all v ≥ u if v  A then v  B.
If a formula is forced in every world of an r-model, we say that it is satisﬁed
in this r-model. If a formula A is satisﬁed in all r-models we say that it is
valid, in symbols |= A.
Constants 0 and 1 corresponds to intuitionistic falsum and verum. If a for-
mula of ICL does not contain constant ⊥, then it is an intuitionistic formula.
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Forcing of ⊥ distinguishes between the root of an r-model and the rest of
worlds. We will call every world properly above the root an imaginary world.
We use symbols u, v, w to represent arbitrary worlds in W and the symbol
i to represent an imaginary world.
Because of two diﬀerent constants for falsum, it is possible to deﬁne two
diﬀerent negations
Intuitionistic negation: ∼p = p → 0
Classical negation: ¬ p = p →⊥
The term classical in the name of the second negation refers to the law
of excluded middle which, with respect to this negation, is an ICL tautology.
Let us suppose that p ∨ ¬p is refuted in the root of some r-model:
r  p ∨ ¬p.
This is equivalent to
r  p and r  ¬p
which implies that r  p and there exists a world u ≥ r such that u  p
and u ⊥. Condition u ⊥ means that u = r . Hence we get a contradic-
tion. Nevertheless this negation is not fully classical—it is not involutive as
¬¬p does not imply p. It is because this negation is deﬁned using intuition-
istic implication. For this reason we prefer to call it ⊥-negation, instead of
“classical” negation.
In [1] Liang and Miller deﬁned sequent calculus LJC for Intuitionistic
Control Logic and proved soundness and completeness of LJC with respect
to the Kripke semantics. However, in this paper we focus on the semanti-
cal approach and the equivalence between provability of a formula and its
validity in all r-models is alluded to only in Theorem 3.3. The symbol  A
denotes provability of a formula A in LJC.
For a background in intuitionistic logic see [3].
3. Negational Fragment
In this paper we will consider monadic purely negational fragment of ICL,
i.e. the fragment in the language of ∼, ¬ and p only. It means that we treat
both negations as primitive connectives, not deﬁned by means of constants
and implication. Formulae of this fragment will be called n-formulae.
It will be understood that Nk and Nm are diﬀerent sequences of both
negations and that k,m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} = N. To discriminate sequences of
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the same length we will use superscripts N1k , N
2
k etc. By ∼n and ¬n we will
understand iteration of n negations of given kind. We will denote by Nkp
an n-formula with k negations of both kinds. By the length of an n-formula
Nkp we deﬁne the number k of negations. Formulae of the form N2jp and
N2j+1p will be called even n-formula and odd n-formula, respectively. We
will treat the variable p as a negational formula of the length 0.
Every r-model deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.1 is a model for monadic purely
negational fragment of ICL as well. However, since negations ∼ and ¬ are our
primitive notions, considering r-models for negational fragment we should
deﬁne interpretation of these connectives independently.
Definition 3.1. A Kripke model for the negational fragment of ICL is a tu-
ple M = 〈W, r ,≤,〉 where W , r and ≤ are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.1
and the forcing relation  is restricted to the variable p. Additionally we
deﬁne the interpretation of negations:
• u  ∼A iﬀ w  A, for allw ≥ u
• u  ¬A iﬀ w  A or w > r , for allw ≥ u.
It is according to the deﬁnition of forcing for constants 0,⊥ and intu-
itionistic implication in the case of full language. Forcing of intuitionistic
negation is standard. For ⊥-negation we have
u  ¬p iﬀ w  p or w ⊥, for allw ≥ u.
The condition w ⊥ means that w is an imaginary world.
Fact 3.2. For every n-formula A we have:
(1) r  ¬A iﬀ r  A,
(2) r  ¬A iﬀ r  A,
(3) u  ¬A iﬀ u = r and u  A for arbitrary u ∈ W ,
(4) i  ¬A for all i > r .
The ﬁrst point is straightforward from deﬁnition. In ICL the distinction
between the root of the r-model and other worlds is expressed by the forc-
ing of ⊥, whereas in the monadic purely negational fragment the root of
the model is the only world in which ⊥-negation of a formula can be refuted:
u  ¬A iﬀ w  A and w = r , for somew ≥ u.
It follows that ⊥-negation of a formula is forced in every imaginary world.
We are interested in relations between n-formulae and we investigate
validity of formulae of the form Nkp → Nmp. We denote by N the set of all
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n-formulae. In the standard way we deﬁne an equivalence relation ≡ on the
set N :
A ≡ B iﬀ |= A → B and |= B → A.
As usual, we consider the quotient set:
N/≡ = {[A]≡ | A ∈ N},
where [A]≡ is the equivalence class of a formula A. The relation  on N/≡
is given by:
[A]≡  [B]≡ iﬀ |= A → B.
Although the relation  is deﬁned on equivalence classes, no confusion
should arise if we use it to denote a relation between two n-formulae:
A  B iﬀ |= A → B.
If for an n-formula A = Nkp exists an n-formula B = Nmp such that A ≡ B
and m < k, we say that A is reducible to B. In the other case we say that
an n-formula A is irreducible.
Most proofs of facts about implicational relations between n-formulae are
reduced to showing a contradiction in the procedure of ﬁnding a counter-
model for a formula A → B. For n-formulae of a length greater that 4 we
repeatedly refer to Substitution Theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (Substitution Theorem). For any formula A(p1, . . . , pn, s),
where p1, . . . , pn, s are propositional variables and for all formulae B,C if
 B ↔ C then
 A(p1, . . . , pn, B/s) ↔ A(p1, . . . , pn, C/s).
It is well-known that this theorem holds for IPL. The proof is by induction
on the complexity of formulae. However, the case of additional constant ⊥
does not interfere with the proof, thus the theorem holds for ICL as well.
4. Relations Between Models
In a Kripke model for either ICL or its negational fragment let ◦ mark a node
in which a variable p is refuted and • a node in which p is forced.
Firstly, let us consider two basic n-formulae ∼p and ¬p. It is easy to see
that minimal model and countermodel for ∼p are ◦ and • respectively. In
the case of ¬p due to Fact 3.2 we have r  ¬p iﬀ r  p and r  ¬p iﬀ
r  p. Thus a minimal model for ¬p is ◦ and minimal countermodel is •.
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The fact that ∼p and ¬p have the same minimal models and counter-
models does not imply that these formulae are equivalent. There is a model
in which ¬p is satisﬁed and ∼p is refuted, namely:
•i
◦ r
It is easy to see, that for every n-formula Nkp the minimal model or
countermodel are ◦ and •. These cases may seem not very interesting as
they collapse both negations to the situation of ordinary classical nega-
tion. However, looking for a countermodel for an intuitionistic implication
of two formulae is equivalent to looking for a model for the antecedent and
a countermodel for the consequent. While considering an implication of two
n-formulae, one of these cases is frequently reduced to either ◦ or •, so it is
suﬃcient to know if the variable can be forced or refuted in a given world
of the model. This depends on the evenness of the sequence of negations
preceding the variable. The following fact becomes useful in such situations.
Proposition 4.1. For every world u in an r-model M we have:
(1) if u  N2kp then w  p or w > r , for some w ≥ u,
(2) if u  N2k+1p then w  p or w > r , for some w ≥ u,
(3) if u  N2kp then w  p or w > r , for some w ≥ u,
(4) if u  N2k+1p then w  p or w > r , for some w ≥ u.
Proof. We prove only one of the two most complex cases which is (2) :
others can be proven in an analogous way.
Let M be an r-model and u an arbitrary world in this model. The proof
is by induction on k.
Let k = 0 and let A = N1p. We have to consider two cases:
Case 1. A = ∼p.
Assume that u  ∼p. Then for all w ≥ u we have w  p and the claim
follows.
Case 2. A = ¬p.
From the assumption that u  ¬p it follows that either u = r and u  p or
u > r . In both cases the claim follows.
For the induction step, let k ≥ 0 and let A = N2(k+1)+1p. Now, we
consider following cases:
Case 1. A = ∼∼N2k+1p.
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Assume that
u  ∼∼N2k+1p.
Then for every v ≥ u there exists a world v′ ≥ v such that v′  N2k+1p.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, there is w ≥ v′ with
w  p or w > r .
In particular, by transitivity of the accessibility relation ≤, it follows that
the claim holds.
Case 2. A = ∼¬N2k+1p.
From the assumption
u  ∼¬N2k+1p
we get that for every world u′ ≥ u we have u′  ¬N2k+1p. From point 3
of Fact 3.2 it follows that u = u′ = r and r is the only world of the model
and
r  N2k+1p,
which, by the induction hypothesis, implies the claim.
Case 3. A = ¬∼N2k+1p.
Then from
u  ¬∼N2k+1p
it follows that, in particular,
u  ∼N2k+1p or u > r.
If the latter holds, we are done. The former implies that there is u′ ≥ u with
u′  N2k+1p
and the claim follows from the induction hypothesis.
Case 4. A = ¬¬N2k+1p.
Assume that
u  ¬¬N2k+1p.
Then it follows that either u > r , in which case the claim holds, or u = r
and u  ¬N2k+1p. If so, from Fact 3.2 we have r  N2k+1p and again, by
the induction hypothesis, we get the claim.
Let us consider an implication of two diﬀerent n-formulae Nkp → Nmp.
Such a formula is never valid if the evenness of k is not the same as that
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of m. Indeed, suppose that
r  Nkp → Nmp
and let k = 2j1,m = 2j2 + 1 for some j1, j2 ∈ N. Then there exists a world
u ≥ r such that
u  N2j1p and u  N2j2+1p.
In this case the minimal countermodel is •. The other case of evenness is
symmetrical with a countermodel ◦.
In fact for an implication of two diﬀerent n-formulae we never need
a countermodel of height greater than 2. It is because the implication which
bounds two n-formulae is the only connective that in building a counter-
model requires creating a new world possibly above the root. The search for
a countermodel for a formula
A = Nkp → Nmp
always starts with the assumption that r  A which is equivalent to the fact
that there is a world u ≥ r such that
u  Nkp and u  Nmp.
The minimal countermodel for any n-formula is either ◦ or •. Intuitionis-
tic negation inﬂuences only the forcing of a subformula at the given world,
regardless what kind of the world it is. Considering the ⊥-negation of
a formula requires discriminating the root from imaginary worlds. In other
worlds, forcing of the variable in a given world is one of the two ways of
distinguishing worlds in a model. The other one, as was already said, is
refuting the ⊥-negation of a formula.
Example 4.2. Let A = ¬¬∼p and B = ¬∼∼p. We will show that A  B
and B  A.
Suppose that there exists an r-model in which A → B is not satisﬁed i.e.
this formula is refuted in some world of this model. Showing a contradiction
will give us A  B.
Refutation of a formula in some world of an r-model means that it cannot
be forced in the root of the model: r  A → B, so there exists a world
u possibly above the root, such that u  ¬¬∼p and u  ¬∼∼p. The ﬁrst
condition says that either the world u is imaginary or u = r and the variable
p is not forced in any node of the model. The latter condition implies that
u = r and for every world w in the model exists w′ ≥ w with w′  p, hence
a contradiction. It follows that A  B.
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Suppose that for some r-model r  B → A. Then again there exists
a world u possibly above the root in which u  ¬∼∼p and u  ¬¬∼p.
Refuting the formula ¬¬∼p in some world of a model means that this world
is the root and there must exists a node somewhere in the model in which p
is forced. If so, forcing of the formula ¬∼∼p implies that there exists a world
w ≥ r for which w′  p for every w′ ≥ w, so in particular r  p. The least
possible countermodel is:
◦



 •




◦
The ﬁrst part of the example shows that in looking for a countermodel
the kind of a current world (either the root or imaginary) is important.
The second part shows the diﬀerence of forcing of the variable in imaginary
worlds. No bigger models would be necessary, as there is only one variable
to validate and only one intuitionistic implication.
In other worlds forcing or refuting an intuitionistic negation of a formula
in a world possibly above the root cannot extort creating a new world prop-
erly above. Forcing of ⊥-negation of a formula in the root depends on the
forcing of the variable, above the root it is always forced. The case of refuted
⊥-negation of a formula sends us back to the root.
For a monadic negational formula there are two possible countermodels
of the height of 1 and four possible countermodels of the height of 2:
◦ •
◦
◦
•
◦
•
•
◦



 •




◦
0 1 02 2 12 3
Let us denote the set {0, 1, 02, 2, 12, 3} of these models by S.
We are interested in ﬁnding the upper bound of the number of non-
equivalent n-formulae. We are looking for n-formulae A and B such that
A  B. It means that there exists a model for the formula A in which we
can refute the other n-formula. To every implication A → B we can assign
a subset of S of models in which this formula is refuted. Such subset cannot
contain both of the models ◦ and •, because contradiction is not expressible
in our language. There are 25 such subsets of S, so there are at most 32 non
equivalent monadic n-formulae.
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The existence of only six possible models for monadic n-formulae enables
to characterize these formulae in terms of their models. Let ‘+’ stand for
‘valid’, and ‘–’ for ‘not valid’. For example for the formula p we have
N0 0 1 0
2 2 12 3
p – + – – + –
and for n-formulae of the length 2 we have
N2 0 1 0
2 2 12 3
∼∼p – + – + + –
∼¬p – + – – – –
¬∼p – + – + + +
¬¬p – + – – + –
It can be seen that there are two countermodels for a formula ∼∼p → ∼¬p,
namely 2 and 12. However, we could also see that sets of models for p
and ¬¬p are the same, and it is known, that ⊥-negation is not involutive.
Obviously some informations are missing.
In the case of IPL, when we look for a countermodel of a formula A→B, we
can always start with the assumption that this implication is already falsiﬁed
in the root of the model, i.e. we can assume that r  A and r  B. That
is because in IPL the root of the model is no diﬀerent from other worlds. We
already saw that in ICL there is a considerable diﬀerence between the root
and any imaginary world, e.g. the root is the only world of the model in
which ¬A can be refuted. It is not enough to look for countermodels of an
n-formula starting in the root of an r-model. The forcing of it has to be also
revised in those possible imaginary worlds of models 02, 2, 12 and 3. It is not
suﬃcient to examine sets of models and countermodels for each n-formula.
Its validity has to be also veriﬁed in every pseudosubmodel. Here by the
pseudosubmodel we mean any generated submodel in the sense of IPL which
is not an r-model, that is which consists in this case of imaginary worlds
only. Let us denote i(0), i(1) the pseudosubmodels of 02 and 12 respectively.
The pseudosubmodel of 2 is the same as that of 12, and i(0), i(1) are the
two pseudosubmodels of the model 3.
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For p and ¬¬p we have
i(0) i(1)
p – +
¬¬p + +
Indeed, assume that
r  ¬¬p → p.
Then in some world u ≥ r we have u  ¬¬p and u  p. Forcing of a double
⊥-negation of the variable in a world possibly above the root implies that
eitheru > r or u = r and u  p,
hence the countermodel for a formula ¬¬p → p is 02 and 3.
5. Semantic Characterisation of n-Formulae
It was already emphasised that no n-formula with odd number of negations
can be equivalent to n-formula with even number of negations. Therefore all
properties concerning equivalences between n-formulae are divided into two
cases: for odd and even length of n-formulae. The property of reduction of
negations with respect to sequences of one type of negation is straightforward
and it follows from the fact that both ∼∼∼p ≡ ∼p and ¬¬¬p ≡ ¬p.
Proposition 5.1. For any k ∈ N we have:
(1) ∼(2k+2)p ≡ ∼∼p,
(2) ∼(2k+1)p ≡ ∼p,
(3) ¬(2k+2)p ≡ ¬¬p,
(4) ¬(2k+1)p ≡ ¬p.
Proof. Ad (1) and (2)
Equivalence between ∼p and ∼∼∼p is an intuitionistic tautology. From
this and the Substitution Theorem we get the thesis.
Ad (3) and (4)
Let us see that ¬¬¬p ≡ ¬p. Suppose that |= ¬¬¬p → ¬p, so there exists
an r-model in which r  ¬¬¬p → ¬p. Then there exists a world u ≥ r
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such that
u  ¬¬¬p and u  ¬p.
According to point (3) of Fact 3.2, refuting the ⊥-negation of a formula
in some world of a model sends us back to the root, so the latter condi-
tion implies that u = r and u  p. If so, from the former condition and
point (1) of Fact 3.2 it follows that in the root the formula ¬¬p is refuted.
A contradiction, since this means that r  p.
Suppose that the formula ¬p → ¬¬¬p is not valid. Then in the root of
some r-model we have r  ¬p → ¬¬¬p. Hence for a world u possibly above
the root we have
u  ¬p and u  ¬¬¬p.
Similar argumentation as in the previous case with respect to the second
condition shows that u = r and u  ¬¬p. From points (1) and (2) of
Fact 3.2 we have that r  p. On the other hand, since u = r , from u  ¬p
follows r  p, a contradiction. Therefore ¬¬¬p ≡ ¬p and the claim follows
from Theorem 3.3.
In [1] Liang and Miller distinguished a formula ∼¬A → A. It enables to
emulate the C control operator. From point (1) of the following proposition it
follows that the formula ∼¬p is a representative of a wide class of equivalent
n-formulae of the form ∼¬N2kp. Point (2) shows a similar result for a class
of odd n-formulae.
Proposition 5.2. For any k ∈ N we have:
(1) ∼¬N2kp ≡ ∼¬p,
(2) ∼¬N2k+1p ≡ ∼¬¬p.
Proof. Ad (1) Assume there exists an r-model M in which r  ∼¬N2kp →
∼¬p. Thus there exists a world u ≥ r for which we have
u  ∼¬N2kp and u  ∼¬p,
that is in all worlds above the world u the formula ¬N2kp is refuted, which
means that the possible countermodel consists of the root only and that
r  N2kp. Thus from point (1) of Proposition 4.1 we have r  p. On
the other hand, refuting the formula ∼¬p in the root in particular implies
that r  p. A contradiction.
Let r be the root of some r-model in which a formula ∼¬p → ∼¬N2kp
is not satisﬁed. Then for some world u ≥ r we claim that
u  ∼¬p and u  ∼¬N2kp.
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As could be already seen in the case of reverse implication, forcing of the for-
mula ∼¬p in arbitrary world implies that the model is reduced to the root
and r  p. From point (3) of Proposition 4.1 with respect to the second
condition and the fact that the model comprises the root only, it yields that
r  p. From which we get a contradiction and as a result the claim follows.
The proof of point (2) is analogous.
Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 show that in many cases we can
reduce an n-formula of a greater length to a formula of length less than 4.
In fact the formula ∼¬p implies every n-formula with even number of
negations. Thus we get a minimal element with respect to relation  for
the subset of even n-formulae. Analogically the formula ∼¬¬p is the minimal
element for the subset of odd n-formulae. These two facts are corollaries from
points (1) and (2) of Proposition 5.2 and the following proposition:
Proposition 5.3. For every k,m ∈ N following implications hold:
(1) ∼¬N2kp → N2mp,
(2) ∼¬N2k+1p → N2m+1p.
Proof. Ad (1)
Assume r  ∼¬N2kp → N2mp for the root of some r-model M. Then in
some world u ≥ r we have u  ∼¬N2kp and u  N2mp. From the former
it follows that the root is the only world of the model M and r  ¬N2kp.
According to point (2) of Fact 3.2 it follows that r  N2kp. On the other
hand r  N2mp, a contradiction.
Ad (2)
Let M be an r-model in which r  ∼¬N2k+1p → N2m+1p. Then there
exists a world u ≥ r such that u  ∼¬N2k+1p and u  N2m+1p. Hence,
due to a similar reasoning as in point (1), since the root is the only world
of the model we have r  N2k+1p and r  N2m+1p, a contradiction.
It is worth noting that n-formulae ∼∼¬¬p and ∼∼¬p are maximal ele-
ments with respect to the relation  for subsets of even n-formulae and odd
n-formulae, respectively.
Proposition 5.4. For any k ∈ N following implications are valid:
(1) N2kp → ∼∼¬¬p,
(2) N2k+1p → ∼∼¬p.
Proof. Ad (1)
Let M be an r-model in which r  N2kp → ∼∼¬¬p. Then there exist
a world u possibly above the root such that u  N2kp and u  ∼∼¬¬p.
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The latter implies that the model M consists of only one element, namely
the root and r  p. If there are no worlds properly above the root, then from
u  N2kp, according to point (1) of Proposition 4.1 it follows in particular
that r  p, a contradiction.
The proof of point (2) is analogous.
It is clear that for every k ∈ N there are 2k n-formulae Nkp. It was already
said that there are at most 32 non equivalent n-formulae. Procedure of ﬁnd-
ing these n-formulae is reduced to checking if the relation Nkp  Nmp holds.
Such a checking for every pair of n-formulae would be arduous. To avoid this,
our idea is to characterize a negational formula in terms of its models and
countermodels. Then instead of checking satisﬁability of formulae of the form
Nkp → Nmp for subsequent n-formulae Nkp,Nmp, it is suﬃcient to compare
sets of models and countermodels, including pseudosubmodels, for these n-
formulae. For an n-formula Nkp let S+(Nkp) be the subset of S∪{i(0), i(1)}
of models in which n-formula Nkp is valid. The relation Nkp  Nmp between
two n-formulae holds if and only if S+(Nkp) ⊆ S+(Nmp). Complete list of
sets S+(Nkp) for a given n-formula Nkp up to the length of 5 are given in
the Appendix.
All proofs of Facts 5.5–5.10 are similar to the proof of Proposition 5.1.
They are not informative, thus omitted.
As a representative for every equivalence class we choose a formula of
the smallest length. We start with three equivalence classes of the simplest
n-formulae, namely
[p]≡, [∼p]≡ and [¬p]≡
and we will shortly discuss subsequent n-formulae.
Fact 5.5. All n-formulae of length 2 are pairwise non equivalent.
As none of n-formulae N2p is reducible, we can distinguish four diﬀerent
equivalence classes:
[∼∼p]≡, [∼¬p]≡, [¬∼p]≡, [¬¬p]≡.
There are 8 n-formulae N3p. From Proposition 5.1 if follows that ∼∼∼p and
¬¬¬p are reducible to ∼p and ¬p respectively.
Fact 5.6. There are only two irreducible formulae N3p that are not equiv-
alent to any other n-formulae of the length 3, namely ¬∼∼p and ¬¬∼p.
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Fact 5.7. For n-formulae of the length 3 we have following equivalences:
(1) ∼∼¬p ≡ ¬∼¬p,
(2) ∼¬∼p ≡ ∼¬¬p.
From Proposition 5.1.(2), Proposition 5.1.(4), Fact 5.6 and Fact 5.7 it
follows that there are only 4 irreducible and not equivalent n-formulae N3p.
We choose following representatives:
[∼¬¬p]≡, [¬¬∼p]≡, [¬∼∼p]≡ and [∼∼¬p]≡.
Most of n-formulae N4p could be reduced to some n-formula N2p using
Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2. Remaining n-formulae are divided into
three equivalence classes.
Fact 5.8. For n-formulae of the length 4 we have following equivalences:
(1) ∼∼¬∼p ≡ ¬∼¬∼p ≡ ∼∼¬¬p ≡ ¬∼¬¬p,
(2) ¬¬∼¬p ≡ ¬∼∼¬p.
Fact 5.9. There is only one irreducible n-formula of length 4 that is not
equivalent to any other n-formula N4p, namely ¬¬∼∼p.
Recapitulating, we can distinguish three representatives of irreducible
and not equivalent n-formulae of the length 4 which will denote equivalence
classes:
[¬∼∼¬p]≡, [¬¬∼∼p]≡ and [∼∼¬¬p]≡.
Fact 5.10. There are only 4 irreducible n-formulae of the length 5. These
formulae are equivalent: ¬∼∼¬∼p ≡ ¬∼∼¬¬p ≡ ¬¬∼¬∼p ≡ ¬¬∼¬¬p.
The equivalence class of these n-formulae will be denoted by
[¬∼∼¬¬p]≡.
All remaining n-formulae N5p are reducible to some formulae N3p. Equiva-
lences between n-formulae N5p and N3p are based on Proposition 5.1, Propo-
sition 5.2 and the Substitution Theorem. There is only one not obvious case
namely ¬¬∼∼¬p ≡ ∼∼¬p. Let us refer the Reader to the list of sets S+ in
the Appendix. For the two considered n-formulae, sets of models in which
these n-formulae are valid are equal:
S+(¬¬∼∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)} = S+(∼∼¬p),
thus these n-formulae are equivalent.
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Corollary 5.11. Every n-formula N6p is reducible to some n-formula Nkp
of length k ≤ 4.
Proof. For every n-formula N6p there exists a sequence N5 such that either
N6p = ∼N5p or N6p = ¬N5p. We consider two cases.
Case 1. The formula N5p is reducible to some n-formula N3p. Then we
have either N6p ≡ ∼N3p or N6p ≡ ¬N3p, which implies that every n-formula
N6p is reducible to some n-formula N4p.
Case 2. The formula N5p is irreducible. Then from Fact 5.10 follows that
N5p ∈ [¬∼∼¬¬p]≡. If N6p = ∼N5p then in particular N6p ≡ ∼¬∼∼¬¬p
and from Proposition 5.2.(1) follows that N6p ≡ ∼¬p. If N6p = ¬N5p then
in particular N6p ≡ ¬¬¬∼¬¬p. From point (4) of Proposition 5.1 it follows
that N6p ≡ ¬∼¬¬p.
Theorem 5.12. Every n-formula Nkp, for k ≥ 6 is reducible to some n-
formula of length m ≤ 5.
Proof. By induction on k. The induction base follows from Corollary 5.11.
Assume that k ≥ 6. We consider simultaneously two analogous cases for
∈{∼,¬}. Let Nk+1p = Nkp. From the induction hypothesis there exists
a sequence Nm such that m ≤ 5 and Nkp ≡ Nmp. Thus we have Nk+1p ≡
Nmp. If m < 5, we get the thesis. Else it is the case of the induction
base.
6. Equivalence Classes of n-Formulae
As a conclusion from the previous section, especially Facts 5.5–5.10, Corol-
lary 5.11 and Theorem 5.12 we get the exact power of the set N/≡.
Theorem 6.1. There are exactly 15 (up to equivalence) pairwise not equiv-
alent and irreducible n-formulae:
p, ∼∼p, ∼¬p, ¬∼p, ¬¬p, ∼∼¬¬p, ¬∼∼¬p, ¬¬∼∼p,
∼p, ¬p, ∼∼¬p, ∼¬¬p, ¬∼∼p, ¬¬∼p, ¬∼∼¬¬p.
Two following theorems gather all relations between elements of the set
N/≡. We present them in the form of implications of n-formulae for chosen
representatives of equivalence classes, as this is more readable. By stating
that an implication Nkp → Nmp is valid we mean also that the reverse
implication is not valid.
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Theorem 6.2. Following implications of even n-formulae are valid:
(1) ∼¬p → p
(2) p → ¬¬p
(3) ¬¬p → ¬¬∼∼p
(4) ¬¬∼∼p → ¬∼p
(5) ¬∼p → ∼∼¬¬p
(6) ∼¬p → ¬∼∼¬p
(7) ¬∼∼¬p → ¬¬p
(8) p → ∼∼p
(9) ∼∼p → ¬¬∼∼p
Theorem 6.3. Following implications of odd n-fomulae are valid:
(1) ∼¬¬p → ∼p
(2) ∼p → ¬¬∼p
(3) ¬¬∼p → ¬∼∼p
(4) ¬∼∼p → ¬p
(5) ¬p → ∼∼¬p
(6) ∼¬¬p → ¬∼∼¬¬p
(7) ¬∼∼¬¬p → ¬¬∼p
Proof. As a proof of Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.3 we refer the Reader
to the list of sets S+ for n-formulae in the Appendix. Checking the validity
of a formula Nkp → Nmp (and stating that the reverse implication is not
valid) is reduced to checking if S+(Nkp)  S+(Nmp). For example for point
(7) of the Theorem 6.3 we have
S+(¬∼∼¬¬p) = {0, i(0), i(1)}
and
S+(¬¬∼p) = {0, 02, i(0), i(1)}.
Relations between classes of equivalent formulae are described by Lin-
denbaum Algebra. In the case of negational monadic fragment of ICL we
cannot create such a structure. So we present a poset (N ∗ ∪ {0,⊥, 1},),
where N ∗ is the set of chosen representatives of equivalence classes of N/≡.
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1
∼∼¬¬p
 ∼∼¬p

¬∼p ¬p
¬¬∼∼p ¬∼∼p
∼∼p
 ¬¬p ¬¬∼p
p
 ¬∼∼¬p

¬∼∼¬¬p
										 ∼p
∼¬p
											
⊥










 ∼¬¬p

0


The addition of constants enables to join the two posets of equivalence
classes of even and odd n-formulae.
After looking into properties of negational formulae several questions
arose. They consider mainly computational content of n-formulae. Further
work would also include investigations of implicational fragment of ICL.
Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons At-
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Appendix
We give a complete list of sets S+ for n-formulae Nkp up to the length of 5.
1. S+(p) = {1, 12, i(1)}
2. S+(∼p) = {0, 02, i(0)}
3. S+(¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 3, i(0), i(1)}
4. S+(∼∼p) = {1, 2, 12, i(1)}
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5. S+(∼¬p) = {1}
6. S+(¬∼p) = {1, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
7. S+(¬¬p) = {1, 12, i(0), i(1)}
8. S+(∼∼∼p) = {0, 02, i(0)}
9. S+(∼∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
10. S+(∼¬∼p) = {0}
11. S+(∼¬¬p) = {0}
12. S+(¬∼∼p) = {0, 02, 3, i(0), i(1)}
13. S+(¬∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
14. S+(¬¬∼p) = {0, 02, i(0), i(1)}
15. S+(¬¬¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 3, i(0), i(1)}
16. S+(∼∼∼∼p) = {1, 2, 12, i(1)}
17. S+(∼∼∼¬p) = {1}
18. S+(∼∼¬∼p) = {1, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
19. S+(∼∼¬¬p) = {1, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
20. S+(∼¬∼∼p) = {1}
21. S+(∼¬∼¬p) = {1}
22. S+(∼¬¬∼p) = {1}
23. S+(∼¬¬¬p) = {1}
24. S+(¬∼∼∼p) = {1, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
25. S+(¬∼∼¬p) = {1, i(0), i(1)}
26. S+(¬∼¬∼p) = {1, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
27. S+(¬∼¬¬p) = {1, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
28. S+(¬¬∼∼p) = {1, 2, 12, i(0), i(1)}
29. S+(¬¬∼¬p) = {1, i(0), i(1)}
30. S+(¬¬¬∼p) = {1, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
31. S+(¬¬¬¬p) = {1, 12, i(0), i(1)}
32. S+(∼∼∼∼∼p) = {0, 02, i(0)}
33. S+(∼∼∼∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
34. S+(∼∼∼¬∼p) = {0}
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35. S+(∼∼∼¬¬p) = {0}
36. S+(∼∼¬∼∼p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
37. S+(∼∼¬∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
38. S+(∼∼¬¬∼p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
39. S+(∼∼¬¬¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
40. S+(∼¬∼∼∼p) = {0}
41. S+(∼¬∼∼¬p) = {0}
42. S+(∼¬∼¬∼p) = {0}
43. S+(∼¬∼¬¬p) = {0}
44. S+(∼¬¬∼∼p) = {0}
45. S+(∼¬¬∼¬p) = {0}
46. S+(∼¬¬¬∼p) = {0}
47. S+(∼¬¬¬¬p) = {0}
48. S+(¬∼∼∼∼p) = {0, 02, 3, i(0), i(1)}
49. S+(¬∼∼∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
50. S+(¬∼∼¬∼p) = {0, i(0), i(1)}
51. S+(¬∼∼¬¬p) = {0, i(0), i(1)}
52. S+(¬∼¬∼∼p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
53. S+(¬∼¬∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
54. S+(¬∼¬¬∼p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
55. S+(¬∼¬¬¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
56. S+(¬¬∼∼∼p) = {0, 02, i(0), i(1)}
57. S+(¬¬∼∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
58. S+(¬¬∼¬∼p) = {0, i(0), i(1)}
59. S+(¬¬∼¬¬p) = {0, i(0), i(1)}
60. S+(¬¬¬∼∼p) = {0, 02, 3, i(0), i(1)}
61. S+(¬¬¬∼¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 12, 3, i(0), i(1)}
62. S+(¬¬¬¬∼p) = {0, 02, i(0), i(1)}
63. S+(¬¬¬¬¬p) = {0, 02, 2, 3, i(0), i(1)}
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